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procreate, and Oakley v. Wisconsin, which addresses whether men
convicted of failing to pay child support lose their right to procreate.
I argue that regardless of whether courts uphold or restrict men’s
rights in these cases, the way courts frame their decisions has negative
implications for women. By addressing cases concerning both men
and women from 1967-2002, this article contributes to a more
thorough understanding of reproductive control in the criminal
justice system, its significance for gender equality, and the right of all
people, regardless of wealth, to have families.
INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 2000, Judge Dorothy McCarter of Helena, Montana
ordered Dawn Sprinkle, who had been convicted of using drugs
during pregnancy and who later violated her probation, not to get
pregnant for ten years.1 Specifically, Judge McCarter sentenced her
to ten years in prison (suspending five), and ordered Sprinkle to take
birth control pills and report for regular pregnancy tests at the local
jail.2 Should Sprinkle become pregnant after serving her time, Judge
McCarter would jail her again or place her under some other form of
intensive supervision.3 As a twenty-nine-year-old woman, Sprinkle
thus faced a decade of intrusive regulation into her intimate life and
health care decisions, as well as the chance that this sentence would
foreclose the possibility of her ever again having a child.4
A spokeswoman for the National Organization for Women told a
reporter, “I have never heard of a judge curtailing a man’s
reproductive life because of drug use; this is exclusively focused on
women.”5 This spokeswoman echoes a common refrain, and with
respect to drug use, it may be true, but to the small extent that
appellate courts have been willing to uphold sex or fertility-related
conditions of probation, they have done so with respect to men.6
1. See State v. Sprinkle, No. 99-55 (D. Mont. Feb. 23, 2000). See generally Lynn
M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62
ALB. L. REV. 999 (1999) (noting that outside of South Carolina, appellate courts have
rejected criminal convictions for child endangerment on the basis of a positive drug
test at birth).
2. See Brief for Respondent at 2, State v. Sprinkle (D. Mont. Feb. 23, 2000) (No.
00-309).
3. See Lawrence Hall, Editorial, A Miscarriage of Justice in the Case of a
Montana Mom, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 23, 2000, at 11 (quoting the judge as saying that
she “doesn’t want another damaged baby born because we didn’t do enough to
supervise that woman”); see also Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Sprinkle (No. 00-309).
4. See Brief for Respondent at 3-6, Sprinkle (No. 00-309).
5. Hall, supra note 3, at 11.
6. See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (upholding the
defendant’s condition of probation, which prohibited him from having any more
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Does this mean that the criminal sentencing arena is one where
women enjoy greater reproductive freedom than men? Such a
conclusion may be premature. The public record suggests that courts
are more likely to impose reproductive restrictions on women in the
first place. And as my reading of the decisions shows, court orders
restricting men’s fertility can only be carried out on the backs of
women.7 Moreover, corrections officials and courts invoke the
principles of gender equality and fairness to women in order to justify
limiting men’s reproductive options. In doing so, they manage both
to hold women responsible for men’s grievances and to compromise
women’s claims to constitutional equality.
While cases like Sprinkle’s have periodically made the news for
more than a decade, two higher court decisions have recently raised
the stakes. One decision, out of the “liberal” Ninth Circuit, upheld
men’s rights, but justified the holding in part by a retrograde
Supreme Court decision undermining women’s rights to equal
protection.8 The other case concerns what constitutes legitimate
punishment for a “deadbeat dad.” That decision divided the
Wisconsin Supreme Court along gender lines, with the four male
justices upholding the punishment and the three women, though in
the gender group more likely to suffer from delinquent support, all
dissenting.9 Both cases help establish a precedent that has negative
implications for women, regardless of whether these decisions and
subseqent holdings uphold or restrict men’s rights.
These decisions inspire a number of questions: What kind of
gender politics do we find in these cases? Given that women and men
of color are much more likely to be criminal defendants, how does
race infuse those politics? What do the cases mean for women and
men in the criminal justice system and beyond?
Part I of this article briefly outlines the standards that courts use to
evaluate whether and to what extent a person retains rights during
prison and probation. Part II examines how men have fared in
asserting their right to procreate from within the confines of prison.10
children until he could show his ability to support his existing children).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by 273
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff’d, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the
lower court’s decision that “the right to procreate does not survive incarceration”).
This decision relies in part on a Supreme Court case which upheld a gender-based
immigration policy on the basis of stereotypes derived from the biological differences
between men and women in procreation. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 54 (2001).
9. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (listing the judges on the court).
10. On female prisoners’ assertions of reproductive rights, see generally Ellen
Barry, Women Prisoners and Health Care: Locked Up and Locked Out, in MAN-MADE
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Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately retreated on male prisoners’
rights, the original panel decision is important because its reasoning
provides the only model for other courts. Parts III-V then examine
the nature and status of reproductive penalties imposed on men and
women sentenced to probation, beginning with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s “deadbeat dad” case and identifying distinctive
gendered patterns emerging out of a quarter century of such cases.11
I conclude with some observations about the significance of these
cases, which are too easily dismissed as inconsequential or the work of
a maverick judge, instead of as a serious threat to women’s rights,
prisoners’ rights, and reproductive rights.
I. RIGHTS RETAINED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
People on probation and parole, in jail and in prison, have engaged
in considerable litigation over the question of what fundamental
rights they retain while under state supervision or behind bars.12
These questions have never been more important than they are today.
More than six million people are under some form of criminal justice
supervision, more than two million of them behind bars, making the
United States the world leader in incarceration.13 A majority of these
prisoners are African American, Latino/a, and Native American men
and women.14 Mandatory sentencing and “three strikes” policies are
of special concern to prisoners and their life partners who may want
children because such policies ensure that prisoners will be
MEDICINE: WOMEN’S HEALTH, PUBLIC POLICY, AND REFORM (Kary Moss ed., 1996)
(describing litigation by women in prison to improve pregnancy care, general
gynecological care, and access to abortion, but not to assert the right to become
pregnant). See also Rachel Roth, Do Prisoners Have Abortion Rights?, 30 FEMINIST
STUDIES 353 (2004).
11. Given the vagaries of media interest as well as the vagaries of electronic
databases and their search engines, it is likely impossible to identify all instances
where judges have imposed reproductive penalties. This article is based on those cases
that I learned about in court opinions and scholarly sources, as well as additional
cases identified by searching news and legal databases.
12. See, e.g., Lisa Davie Levinson, Prisoners’ Rights, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1055,
1055-56 (1998) (providing a brief history of the court opinions shaping which
fundamental rights prisoners retain). See generally JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY (2000) (discussing
the development of constitutional law relating to prisoners’ rights).
13. See Lauren E. Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2002, 2003
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
ppus02.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2004); see also Editorial, Unfree in America, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 31, 2003, at D10.
14. See Paige M. Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at
Midyear 2003, 2004 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. 8 (reporting incarceration rates by
race), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim03.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004). More than ninety percent of prisoners are men. Id. at 5.
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incarcerated for long periods of time.15
Probation is the most common criminal sanction.16
When
someone is sentenced to probation, she is spared the total physical
restraint of incarceration, but is nonetheless under the dominion of
the state and lives with a diminished expectation of privacy and
freedom. According to the California court of appeals, the purpose of
probation is: “to foster rehabilitation and to protect the public to the
end that justice may be done.”17 Sentencing judges typically have
broad discretion to implement this policy goal. In Wisconsin, for
instance, the statute on probation states that, “the court may impose
any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate.”18 A
judge might order someone into drug treatment, for example, to
abstain from alcohol and stay out of bars, to work, go to school, or not
to see certain people.19 Judges have been praised and rebuked for
imposing “shame” penalties, such as wearing a T-shirt that proclaims
“I am a thief.”20
Although the state wields great power through the probation
system, that power is not exempt from all constitutional scrutiny. In
general, conditions should be narrowly tailored when they impinge
on constitutional rights.21
The United States Supreme Court
recognized in 1973 that the revocation of probation, while “not a
stage of a criminal prosecution,” does “result in a loss of liberty,”22
thus implicating due process concerns that cannot be written off on
the theory that probation is “an act of grace.”23
Where prisoners are concerned, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld as a general principle that prisoners “retain those

15. See generally Angela Y. Davis & Cassandra Shaylor, Race, Gender, and the
Prison Industrial Complex: California and Beyond, 2 MERIDIANS 1 (2001) (describing
the relationship between sentencing policies and prison expansion).
16. See Glaze, supra note 13, at 1; see also LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: IN A NUTSHELL 70 (5th ed. 1998)
(“[P]robation is the most frequently imposed criminal sanction.”).
17. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
18. WIS. STAT. § 973.09 (1998) (amended 2004) (emphasis added).
19. See BRANHAM, supra note 16, at 70-74; see also id. at 71 (“Sentencing courts
have traditionally been accorded broad discretion when defining the conditions of a
probation sentence.”).
20. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police: Following the Law Because You’d Be
Embarrassed Not To, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20-27, 1997, at 170 (noting the use of such
punishments for “low level crimes”).
21. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
22. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
23. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 n.2 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.4)
(illustrating that the “grace” theory nonetheless remains alive and well in some
courts, including Wisconsin’s highest court).
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constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with [their] status as
prisoners.”24 In the 1987 case Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court
clarified its approach to prisoners’ rights claims.25 The Court rejected
a strict scrutiny approach, even for alleged infringements of
fundamental rights, and instead concluded that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”26
security being the dominant interest.27
The Court then articulated a four-part test of reasonableness:28
1. A rational relationship between the regulation and the
legitimate and neutral governmental interest that is put forward to
justify the regulation;29
2. The existence of alternative means to exercise the asserted
right;30
3. The impact on prison staff, other prisoners, and prison
resources of accommodating the asserted right;31 and
4. The existence of “ready alternatives” to accommodate the
asserted right at “de minimis” cost to valid penological interests.32
Under this framework, the Court upheld a Missouri regulation
restricting prisoners’ rights to correspond with prisoners at other
institutions, citing concerns with security and burdens on the staff to
screen mail.33 In contrast, the Court struck down a regulation
restricting prisoners’ right to marry without the superintendent’s
permission and absent such “compelling” situations as pregnancy or

24. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 89.
27. See id. (claiming that a strict scrutiny analysis would restrict prison personnel
from dealing effectively with security concerns).
28. See id. at 89-91.
29. See id. at 89 (holding that infringements on prisoners’ constitutional rights
are subjected to low-level scrutiny, also known as the rational basis test).
30. See id. at 90 (concluding that the courts should defer to prison officials’
judgment when prisoners will retain the ability to exercise their constitutional right
despite the regulation).
31. See id. (reasoning that prisons are best able to predict the effect of imposing a
regulation). Therefore, courts should give great deference to prison officials under
this prong. Id.
32. See id. at 90-91 (explaining that while officials should not restrict the
constitutional rights of prisoners when there is a “ready alternative” to doing so, the
Court is not requiring a “least restrictive alternative test”).
33. See id. at 93 (declaring that forcing officials to read prisoners’ mail would be
ineffective in detecting dangerous correspondence because of the “jargon” and
“codes” used).
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the birth of an illegitimate child.34
Turner is thus important for two reasons: the case establishes a
standard of review,35 and it upholds the right to marry.36 The Court
reasoned that while incarceration necessarily imposes substantial
restrictions on marriage, many important attributes of marriage
remain:
First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional
support and public commitment. . . . In addition, many religions
recognize marriages as having spiritual significance . . . . Third,
most inmates will eventually be released by parole or commutation,
and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation
that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital
status is often a pre-condition to the receipt of government
benefits . . . property rights . . . and other, less tangible benefits. . . .
These incidents of marriage . . . are unaffected by the fact of
confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.37

As the phrase “expectation of ultimate consummation” suggests, the
courts have not held that prisoners have a constitutional right to
conjugal visits.38 In the few states where such visits are permitted, they
are typically established by state statute or regulation and are at the
discretion of prison administrators.39
II. GENDER EQUALITY AND THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE FROM PRISON
Few courts have addressed whether and to what extent the right to
procreate survives incarceration, even though the fundamental nature
of the right to procreate is well established. Only three men have
brought claims to court seeking to exercise a right to procreate

34. See id. at 97 (holding that the restriction on marriage was not rationally
related to a legitimate and neutral goal; it did not pass low level constitutional
scrutiny analysis). The Court found that the superintendent “routinely” approved
men’s marriages, but did not make clear whether he did so for reasons other than the
“compelling” ones. Id. The superintendent expressed concern that female prisoners
had been abused by men or overly dependent on men and this abuse or dependence
had contributed to their criminal activity; hence, he wanted them to focus on
developing their independence instead of getting married. Id.
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (identifying the low level rational
basis analysis).
36. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-95 (stating that restrictions on marriage violated
the rational basis test).
37. Id. at 95-96.
38. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994)
(interpreting Turner as including only marriage, not sex, as a right maintained by
prisoners).
39. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622 (holding that while California may permit
conjugal visits, there is no constitutional right to such visits).
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during their prison terms.40 Any decision in this area will have a
disproportionate impact on the reproductive possibilities of African
American and Latino men, who are over-represented in the nation’s
prisons, but the cases themselves do not appear to be overtly
racialized. The public record contains no information about the
individual plaintiffs’ racial identities, and the language of the
decisions is not explicitly racially coded. One of the judges involved
wrote that “the court hastens to speculate as to the institutional and
societal chaos which would result” if prisoners were granted the right
to procreate, but his fear was not clearly directed at any particular
group, except perhaps women.41 All three men who have sought to
exercise their procreative liberties are married, leaving no
opportunity to expound about “illegitimate” children, a theme
evident in cases restricting people on probation from having
children.42
In September 2001, a court vindicated one of these claims for the
first time, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld two-to-one
the procreative rights of a married man serving a life sentence.43
Because he is a “lifer,” William Gerber is not eligible for conjugal
visits, as are other married prisoners in California.44 In order to have
a baby with his wife, Gerber requested permission to send his wife
semen so that she might become pregnant through alternative
insemination. Specifically, Gerber sought to provide semen to his
wife at his own expense, whether by visiting a private doctor or by
using a special overnight mailing kit from a fertility lab, which his
40. See id. at 617; Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990); Percy v. N.J.
Dept. of Corrections, 651 A.2d 1044 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995); see also Pregnant
Pause for Sperm Smuggling Wife, N.Y. POST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 6 (recounting the story
of male prisoners, described as “New York mobsters,” who took matters into their own
hands by bribing guards to ferry their semen to their wives and girlfriends). In one
case, a wife was also criminally implicated, and the state impounded the semen at her
doctor’s office. Id. For related legal actions, see generally Anderson v. Vazquez, 827
F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rejecting claims by death-row prisoners that their civil
rights had been violated by the denial of conjugal visits and the opportunity to
preserve their sperm, and see generally Katherine Bishop, Prisoners Sue to be
Allowed to be Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, describing how the Virginia Supreme
Court denied as frivolous two prisoners’ requests to have their semen frozen for their
girlfriends.
41. Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d,
291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
42. See infra notes 185-194 and accompanying text.
43. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882 (ruling that Gerber’s right to procreate survives
incarceration).
44. See David Kravets, Inmate Has No Right To Mail Sperm from Prison, Court
Rules, APWIRES, May 24, 2002 (declaring that Gerber was sentenced to life in prison
under California’s three strikes law and noting that California excluded from
conjugal visits prisoners serving life sentences and prisoners convicted of sex crimes
or violent crimes against family members or minors).
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attorney offered to pick up or which could be mailed directly from
the prison.45 The court stopped short of saying that Gerber has a
right to do as he wishes, although the decision implicitly anticipates
this result.46 Finding that Gerber’s right to procreate survives
imprisonment, based on precedents protecting prisoners’ fertility as
well as marriage and abortion rights, the court remanded the case for
factual development to find out whether abridging Gerber’s right to
procreate satisfies the Turner test.47
The three judges could not agree on the right at stake. The
majority broadly casts the right as the “right to procreate,”48 rejecting
the district court’s formulation of Gerber’s claim as a “right to
artificial insemination” per se (especially because Gerber wants to
provide semen for his wife to be inseminated).49 The majority also
takes issue with the dissent’s pithy characterization of the ruling as
one upholding a “right to procreate from prison via FedEx.”50 This
sort of semantic dispute has real consequences. The close decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, for instance, shows the impact of narrowly
framing a contested right.51 In that case, five Supreme Court Justices
rejected the idea that the Constitution protects a specific “right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.”52 In contrast, the dissent framed the
issue in terms of a broad-based “right to privacy” that recognizes
intimate relationships as central to personal identity and falling within
a protected sphere of liberty.53 Both cases thus demonstrate the
power of framing issues in the interpretation of constitutional rights.
The State of California argued against granting Gerber’s request on
gender equality grounds. The state argued that if the prison
45. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 885.
46. See id. at 892-93 (stating that Gerber’s right to procreate survives
incarceration and remanding the case for evidentiary development).
47. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (protecting the right to
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (asserting that procreation is “one
of the basic civil rights of man”); Monmouth County Correctional Institutional
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding prisoners’ right to an
abortion, subsidized by the state if necessary).
48. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 886 (deciding the constitutional right in the context
of incarceration).
49. Id. at 886 n.3.
50. Id. at 888 n.6 (quoting Silverman, J., dissenting) (holding that finding a
constitutional right for a prisoner to inseminate his wife would be “radical and
unprecedented”).
51. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the State of
Georgia’s sodomy statute did not impinge on any fundamental rights).
52. Id. at 190.
53. See id. at 217-18. In 2003, the Court recognized a broader meaning of privacy
when it struck down a statute criminalizing sodomy. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
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accommodated Gerber, it would also have to accommodate female
prisoners who wanted to become pregnant through artificial
insemination, thus straining the prisons’ resources.54 The equality
argument originated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons in an earlier
case from which Gerber departs.55 In that case, Steven Goodwin was a
federal prisoner confined in Springfield, Missouri at the United States
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners. Goodwin sought to provide
semen to his wife for the purpose of insemination, at his own expense,
and suggested a variety of means to do so, on or off prison grounds,
with or without the assistance of outside personnel.56 Prison staff
rebuffed his initial requests by saying that the Bureau lacked a
“program or provision” to implement his request.57 Goodwin
appealed the decision, eventually taking his concerns to the federal
courts, where a magistrate judge found that the Bureau’s “no policy”
excuse violated Goodwin’s right to due process.58
The Bureau’s executive staff then went to work, and came up with a
policy statement opposing artificial insemination, seemingly on as
many grounds as it could devise.59 Where the district court had
found the right to procreate incompatible with incarceration, the
Eighth Circuit found it need not reach that question, because it
accepted the Bureau’s argument that accommodating Goodwin’s
request violated its policy of treating prisoners equally—rich or poor,
male or female.60 Indeed, the court almost seems to blame women
for Goodwin’s plight: “male prisoners cannot be allowed to procreate
while incarcerated because the Bureau cannot afford to expand its
54. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 890-91.
55. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that,
assuming a fundamental right to procreation survives incarceration, state regulation
restricting prisoner procreation is valid as reasonably related to the penological
interest of treating male and female prisoners equally).
56. See id. at 1397 (enumerating his various suggestions in a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus).
57. Id. at 1397.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., id. at 1397-98 (noting the Bureau’s concern that allowing prisoners
to artificially inseminate someone would require either the development of collection
and storage procedures for semen, or the acceptance of private medical persons to
come in and collect the semen; both options would create security risks and add costs
to the system). Id. The Bureau does not maintain any publicly available policy about
insemination. My Freedom of Information Act appeal has been pending since January
2003.
60. See id. at 1399 (finding the denial of Goodwin’s request to artificially
inseminate his wife to be reasonably related to the goal of treating male and female
prisoners equally). The Court accepted the Bureau’s contention that if it allowed
men to procreate while incarcerated, it would be required to provide the same
services for women, which would necessitate an expensive expansion of medical
services. Id. at 1398.
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medical services for its female prisoners.”61 The implication is that
men cannot exercise their rights because women’s rights are so
expensive and cumbersome.62
The Ninth Circuit took a third tack, finding first that the right to
procreate survives incarceration, but also that the right as asserted by
Gerber does not implicate equality concerns.63 The Court noted that
it could not “ignore the biological differences between men and
women.”64 Because women and men are not similarly situated with
respect to reproduction, the state’s “legitimate penological interest” in
treating prisoners “equally to the extent possible” is simply not
relevant.65
The “dis/similarly situated” conundrum relates back to the
question of the right at stake.66 Is it a generic right to procreate, in
which a man’s interest will always be in impregnation and a woman’s
will always be in conception? Or, is it a right to procreate with a
spouse in the free world, in which case other options may be possible?
As the court observed, “a more apt parallel may be the question of
whether a woman has the right to donate an egg to her lesbian
partner or to a surrogate mother,” than a right to be inseminated
herself.67
In the end, women who want to press this kind of equal protection
claim might not fare much better than men. The state is likely to
argue that just as pregnancy care imposes greater burdens on a
prison’s budget and staff than sperm donation, so too does egg
donation pose a greater burden. Egg donation typically involves daily
doses of fertility drugs or injections, requiring daily visits to the
prison’s clinic, as well as an invasive procedure guided by an
ultrasound machine to extract the eggs, a procedure which would
likely have to be done at an off-site doctor’s office or facility.68 The

61. Id. at 1400 (emphasis added).
62. See id. (begging the question as to whether women would have equal rights to
similar treatment, given the intermediate standard of scrutiny applied to gender
equality claims and the lower standard of scrutiny applied in prisoners’ rights claims).
63. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882 (noting the distinction between the two sexes in
the context of artificial insemination; men provide their semen to women, and
women are inseminated in order to become pregnant).
64. See id.
65. See id. (noting that because women cannot avail themselves of the
opportunity sought by Gerber, the state’s policy of equal treatment is not implicated).
66. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s inability
to agree on the constitutional right at stake).
67. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891 n.13.
68. See CHERYL L. MEYER, THE WANDERING UTERUS 24-25 (1997) (describing,
generally, the medical procedures associated with egg donation).
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majority’s framework assures that a female prisoner’s request would,
at a minimum, be evaluated under the Turner standard of rational
basis scrutiny.69 The Gerber court observed that a woman’s request
for insemination was not before the court, and that the state could
hardly deny the rights of one group because it might lead other
groups to assert their rights.70
While there is something appealing about the court’s approach and
its willingness to look beyond the prevailing paradigm of women-asalways-potentially-pregnant, the court nonetheless manages to strike a
blow for gender equality. The Gerber court relied on the 2001
Supreme Court decision Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, which reified archaic, biologically-based gender stereotypes
about men and women.71 Because of the underlying equality
concerns, Nguyen brought forth a host of feminist lawyers and
organizations to advocate on behalf of an unlikely beneficiary: Tuan
Anh Nguyen, a young man who had been convicted of a sex offense
and was facing deportation.72 Nguyen was born in Vietnam to a
Vietnamese mother and an American father who were not married to
each other.73 Joseph Boulais returned to the United States with his
son Nguyen, but never filed the necessary paperwork for citizenship
status.74
Had Boulais been a mother instead of a father, he would not have
had to do anything to gain U.S. citizenship for his son. The child
would automatically have been recognized as a U.S. citizen.75 In
Nguyen, the Court upheld this unequal status quo by a five-to-four
decision.76 The opinion inscribes a host of conventional gendered
assumptions about parental responsibility under the guise of

69. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 891.
70. See id.
71. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that a statute making it more
difficult for a child born abroad to become a U.S. citizen when only the father has
United States citizenship did not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment).
72. See id. at 57.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 59-60.
75. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2004) (stipulating that United States citizenship
will be automatically transmitted to a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen
mother so long as the mother was a U.S. citizen at the time of the child’s birth, and
had previously been physically present in the U.S. continuously for at least one year),
with 8 U.S.C. §1409(a) (2004) (stipulating the requirements to gain U.S. citizenship
for a child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father, which include establishment
of a blood relationship; paternity acknowledgement; and a written agreement to
provide financially for the child).
76. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53.
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“undeniable” biological differences.77 Because women are present at
birth, the Court reasoned, they have a “unique opportunity” to
develop a relationship with their child, a relationship which
simultaneously creates ties to the United States.78 Men must take
extra steps to demonstrate a parental attachment worthy of state
recognition because men need not be present at birth, and their
presence does not guarantee paternity.79
Many observers worry that Nguyen will further weaken the already
inferior equal protection consideration afforded to claims of sex
discrimination. Critics focus on two key stereotypes which the
decision relies upon and reinforces. First, the decision perpetuates
the stereotype that women are naturally and automatically mothers,
while men are fathers at their discretion.80 Linda Kerber identifies a
further “ugly” subtext: the notion that women are “tricksters” from
whom men need protection. The legal system historically reinforced
this stereotype by giving men the option of whether or not to
acknowledge or “legitimate” their children born out of wedlock.81
Both Catharine MacKinnon and Kerber see the Court as endorsing
male irresponsibility, in essence giving men, especially military men,
permission to “roam the world” fathering babies out of wedlock and
abandoning them.82 The Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of Nguyen is
particularly troubling, suggesting a trade-off between enhanced
procreative liberty for some men and equal protection of the laws for
all women.
77. Id. at 68.
78. See id. at 65 (noting that the opportunity for a meaningful relationship
between a mother, who is a United States citizen, and her newborn child starts in the
very event of childbirth because “the mother knows that the child is in being and is
hers”).
79. See id. at 62 (noting that an affirmative step, confirming the parental
relationship to the child, needs to be taken if the citizen parent is the father, but not
if the citizen parent is the mother).
80. See Catharine MacKinnon, Can Fatherhood Be Optional?, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2001, at 15 (arguing that the Court assumes that “to be a mother, you just have to
be there; to be a father, you have to do things”). But see an earlier challenge to
gender-specific citizenship requirements, in which Justice Stevens described
motherhood as a matter of conscious choice and work:
If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the
pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion—an alternative that
is available by law to many, and in reality to most, women around the world.
She must then actually give birth to the child. Section 1409(c) rewards that
choice and that labor by conferring citizenship on her child.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998). (I am grateful to Sally Sheldon for
alerting me to this passage).
81. Linda K. Kerber, Top Court Took a Step Backward on Gender Bias, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 23, 2001, at A14.
82. See MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 15.
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When the Ninth Circuit reconsidered Gerber’s case en banc, a bare
six-to-five majority held that the right to procreate is “fundamentally
inconsistent” with incarceration, never reaching the equality
question.83 Although Gerber did not seek “cohabitation, physical
intimacy [or the opportunity to raise] children,” the majority focused
single-mindedly on rulings that prisoners have no right to these
aspects of marriage, and never evaluated the precise nature of
Gerber’s request.84 Judge Tashima’s dissent dismantled this blind
spot piece by piece, concluding that the majority failed to support its
position with virtually any facts, and that the case should be remanded
for evidentiary development.85 Both Judge Tashima and Judge
Kozinski observed that by permitting some prisoners to have conjugal
visits with their spouse, even as a matter of privilege, the legislature
and Department of Corrections could not have intended to abrogate
the right to procreate.86 Of the two, Judge Kozinski more pointedly
argues that if banning reproduction is to be imposed as a form of
punishment, then this is a decision for the legislature to make, not the
warden, who has illegitimately added to Gerber’s punishment by
cutting off his rights.87
III. CONSTRAINING SEX AND REPRODUCTION ON THE OUTSIDE
If prisoners’ assertions of their right to procreate rarely cross
judges’ desks, a more common problem occurs when judges prohibit
criminal defendants from even asserting such rights. Coerced
contraception erupted onto the public agenda when editorial and
judicial entrepreneurs seized on the idea of using Norplant to
temporarily sterilize women whose reproduction they deemed
undesirable.88 For example, a judge in California “offered” Darlene

83. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 623 (concluding that it did not need to determine
whether the prison’s refusal to grant the prisoner’s request was related to a valid
penological interest).
84. Id. at 620-21.
85. See id. at 629.
86. See id. at 626-27 (inquiring how procreation can be per se fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration, as the majority asserted, if some prisoners are allowed
conjugal visits).
87. See id. at 632 (arguing that judgments regarding prisoners’ rights to
procreate “must be made by the legislature in setting the nature and degree of
punishment for particular crimes”); cf. id. at 626 (highlighting that the California
legislature has not enacted any statutes that prohibit artificial insemination by
prisoners).
88. See, e.g., Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18 [hereinafter Underclass] (suggesting in an
editorial that the government should offer “welfare mothers” financial incentives to
use Norplant in order to “reduce the underclass”).
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Johnson, accused of child abuse, a “choice” between seven years in
prison or one year in the local jail, followed by the implantation of
Norplant.89 Although Johnson was certainly responsible for hitting
her children, once she entered the courtroom as a single, pregnant,
African American mother of four who had received Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), she could not control becoming
a symbol for many of the highly charged political debates of the day.90
Just a few months later, sixty percent of respondents told public
opinion pollsters that they approved of mandating Norplant for “drug
abusing women of childbearing age.”91 Much of the commentary has
focused on the Norplant cases as a result of this publicity, but the
introduction of Norplant merely facilitated the imposition—and
enforcement—of sentences judges had already been handing down
for at least twenty-five years, including sentences imposed on men.92
As with so many highly contested forms of reproductive control, we
simply do not know how often judges bar probationers from sex or
procreation. American Law Reports describes only eleven such
decisions.93 These decisions represent cases that went up for
89. See Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725-26
(Cal. 1998) (describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson, in which
the judge ordered that the defendant submit to a Norplant birth-control implant as a
condition of probation (citing People v. Johnson, No. F015316, 1992 WL 685375
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992))). Norplant is a hormonal contraceptive lasting five years that is
implanted in a woman’s upper arm and requires removal by a health professional.
See also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 105-06 (1997).
90. See Underclass, supra note 88, at A18 (suggesting financial incentives for
welfare recipients to use Norplant); ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 151-52 (noting the
public stir that arose regarding the Darlene Johnson case); see also Catherine R.
Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare
Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473 (1995)
(analyzing the constitutionality of legislative proposals to link Norplant use to welfare
benefits).
91. George Skelton & Daniel M. Weintraub, The Times Poll: Most Support
Norplant for Teens, Drug Addicts, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at Part A. But see Lynn
M. Paltrow & Robert Newman, Treatment, Not Sterilization, Is the Way To Help
Addicted Moms, NATIONAL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, (debunking myths
about
substance
abuse
and
drug-exposed
babies),
available
at
http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/oped.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2004).
92. See Toni Driver Saunders, Comment, Banning Motherhood: An RX To
Combat Child Abuse?, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 203 (1994). The law review literature on
coerced contraception is voluminous and almost exclusively concerned with
restrictions imposed on women. Id. A great deal of the literature was written in the
early 1990’s and centers on Darlene Johnson’s case, though other articles offer
particularly helpful reviews of a large number of cases. Id. See also Stacey L. Arthur,
The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or Crime Control?, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1, 43 (1992).
93. See John C. Williams, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant’s
Remaining Childless or Having No Additional Children During Probationary Period,
94 A.L.R.3d 1218 (2004) (recounting and analyzing cases requiring a defendant to
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appellate review, not cases where judges withdrew their orders or
where defendants did not appeal.94 The prospect of jail time no
doubt has a chilling effect on the pursuit of appeals. As Stacey Arthur
notes, because cases like these may not be reported, “those that do
not receive significant media attention can easily go unnoticed.”95
Laurence Tribe seconds this observation, stating that the conditions
are “frequently imposed” but rarely reviewed.96 My own research
finds that since 1966, cases have been reported by the press or the
courts in at least twenty-one states: Arizona, California, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.97 A judge
in New York imposed a ban on reproduction as a form of punishment
in 2004, an apparent first for the Northeast.98 In Florida, judges from
around the state continued to issue such orders even after an
appellate court struck one down in 1979.99 Trial level courts seem to
be doing the same in Ohio.100 The Missouri and Pennsylvania cases
are unusual because federal district court judges issued the
controversial orders.101 In a number of these states, judges have also
“offered” or ordered chemical or surgical castration to men convicted

refrain from having future children).
94. See Mark Curriden, Sterilization Ordered for Child Abuser: From Tennessee
to Texas, Judges Order Procedure When Defendants Volunteer, 79 A.B.A. J. 32, 32
(May 1993).
95. Arthur, supra note 92, at 6 n.19.
96. See Oakley v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 813 (2002), petition for cert. filed, 2001 WL
34116641, at 27-30 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2001) (No. 01-1573).
97. See infra notes 156-57, 169-71, 213-25 and accompanying text; see also
Involuntary Birth Control Is a Too-Simple Solution, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD,
Apr. 5, 1994, at A6 (describing a situation in North Carolina where a lawyer
representing children who were removed from their mother’s custody asked a judge
to order the woman to use Norplant).
98. See Marc Santora, Negligent Upstate Couple Is Told Not To Procreate, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at B6.
99. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
invalid the appellant’s probation term prohibiting her from pregnancy); see also
Judge Finds No Legal Precedent for Ordering Contraception, UNITED PRESS INT’L,
Nov. 14, 1992 (reporting that a Florida judge said he could find no legal precedent to
order a woman to be implanted with birth control, when a local advocacy group asked
that he do so).
100. See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (holding
that prohibiting the defendant from having children during her five-year probation
period was a violation of her constitutional right to privacy and a violation of the trial
court’s discretion).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing
the district court’s order that the defendant not conceive another child with a woman
besides his wife unless he could show that he was supporting his existing children).
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of sex offenses.102 Although other writers often treat all of these cases
as a set, I distinguish them, because judges order castration for the
purpose of preventing sexual assault, not to prevent procreation,
although that will also follow. Legislatures have had little to say about
these issues. The exception is Illinois, which enacted a law to prohibit
judges from requiring birth control as a condition of probation in
1993; an appellate court subsequently ruled that the statute bans
requiring abstinence, which is a form of birth control.103
As a purely technical matter, not all of these cases involved outright
bans on procreation, but they all raise questions about judicial
discretion and power. For instance, in 1988, an Indiana judge made it
clear that while he could not order a woman to be sterilized, he would
be more inclined to give her a shorter sentence if she underwent the
procedure: “She has no need for any more children. I can’t order
this, but she could consider sterilization. It would be a mitigating
circumstance.”104 Melody Baldwin, who pleaded guilty to child
neglect after facing a murder charge in the death of her four-year-old
son, was pregnant when she appeared before the judge. She
complied with his “suggestion,” undergoing sterilization after giving
birth, and the judge sentenced her to ten years out of a possible
twenty in prison.105 Afterwards, Baldwin said that she sometimes
regretted her decision, but “it was the only way.”106 In another case in
1993, a Texas judge “went to great lengths,” according to the news
report, “to have Alice Faye Byrd acknowledge she was accepting
Norplant voluntarily and not as a result of coercion to end her sixmonth stay” in the county jail.107 “But,” the account continues, the
judge “also made it clear to Byrd, 29, that he was ‘not inclined to give
[her] probation if [she didn’t] agree’ to the contraceptive
measure.”108
102. See, e.g., Julianne Malveaux, Wrong Answer To Rape, USA TODAY, Mar. 18,
1992, at A10 (discussing a judge’s offer to a man accused of sexual assaulting a child
to choose between castration or more than twenty years in prison).
103. See People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ill. App. 4d 1995) (interpreting
the statutory language that prohibits courts from imposing any form of birth control
as a condition of probation).
104. Judge Says Sterilization May Ease Sentence for Child’s Death, APWIRES, July
21, 1988.
105. See Woman Who Was Sterilized for Lighter Sentence Says She’s Angry,
ASSOCPR, Nov. 15, 1988, available at 1988 WL 3823085.
106. Id.
107. John Makeig, Woman’s Probation Includes Birth Control: Mother, Whose
Abandoned 4-Year-Old Died in Blaze, Accepts Norplant, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1993,
at 21.
108. Id.; see also Department of Corrections Debates Judge’s Order To Pay for
Tubal Ligation, APWIRES, Aug. 8, 2000 (describing a Pennsylvania case where a
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These cases highlight the fine line between coercion and “choice”
when someone confronts the power of the state. With their freedom
on the line, defendants in criminal cases are extremely vulnerable to
“suggestions” that they sacrifice their sexuality, bodily integrity, and
reproductive intentions for the future, allowing judges to structure
defendants’ lives under the guise of “voluntary” decisions.
Many commentators understandably fear that these probation
conditions will be directed at poor women of color, and some go
further to say that judges do primarily impose reproductive conditions
on this group.109 This can be a difficult claim to verify because the
individuals who have appealed their sentences have not done so on
the basis of race discrimination, thus court opinions and news reports
rarely discuss a defendant’s racial identity. It seems plausible that
some of the women about whom we lack information are white, such
as methamphetamine users.110 News photographs and interviews with
lawyers have provided information in some cases, as well as the
occasional judicial cue: one opinion about a man ordered not to have
children out of wedlock cites statistics on the number of Black
children in poverty, strongly suggesting that the defendant in that
case was African American.111
Even absent systematic racial data, however, several historical and
contemporary trends lend weight to the speculation that the
restrictions fall most heavily on poor women of color. First, the
history of coercive sterilization in this country has been dominated
since mid-century by sterilization abuse of African American, Native
American, and Puerto Rican women.112 Second, because of the
judge acknowledged that he could not order a woman to be sterilized and said that
the procedure would not affect her sentence, but also described sterilization as
something “positive” for the woman to tell the parole board). He ordered the state
Department of Corrections to pay for the operation if the woman asked for the
operation. Id.
109. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Long-Term Contraceptives in the Criminal Justice
System, in COERCED CONTRACEPTION? MORAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF LONG-ACTING
BIRTH CONTROL 134-50 (Ellen Moskowitz & Bruce Jennings eds., 1996); ROBERTS,
supra note 89, at 196. See generally Michelle Oberman, Commentary: The Control
of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6
n.24 (1992).
110. See Fox Butterfield, Across Rural America, Drug Casts a Grim Shadow, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, at 10 (reporting that “federal surveys have consistently shown
that methamphetamine is largely a drug of whites, the less affluent, and those living
in rural areas and west of the Mississippi [River]”).
111. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir.1992) (relating that
“[i]n 1987, 48.1% of black children under six lived below the poverty line”).
112. See ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 95-125 (1995) (describing the history of eugenics and
forced sterilization); see also Judge Says He Wishes He Could Order Woman
Sterilized, APWIRES, Oct. 12, 2000 (describing a federal judge’s comments to a
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“racial distribution of poverty,” Black and Latina women are more
likely to receive public assistance, experience greater intervention
from child protective services, and/or live in poor neighborhoods
that are heavily policed to detect drug activity, all of which bring them
into contact with state actors who may pressure them not to have
children.113 African American women have borne the brunt of
criminal prosecution for using drugs during pregnancy.114 And,
finally, the rhetoric of “illegitimate children,” “irresponsibility,” and
“welfare dependence” that laces judicial and public commentary is
certainly racially coded, regardless of the specific case in which it is
deployed.115
IV. PROHIBITING PROCREATION: A CLOSELY CONTESTED DECISION
Wisconsin v. Oakley is especially significant because it is the only
case barring procreation to have survived the scrutiny of a court of last
resort.116 In a universe of cursory opinions, the Oakley case also
stands out for its depth of analysis and for the acrimony between the
majority and the dissent. The case pits a bloc of male justices who
claim the mantle of advocate for poor women and children, the “true
victims” in this case, whose needs the dissenters “diminish,” against a
bloc of female justices who see danger in their brethren’s reasoning
and actions.117
The State of Wisconsin charged David Oakley with the crime of
intentional failure to pay child support.118 Oakley is the father of
nine children with four different women.119 He worked out a plea
bargain, which included a three-year prison sentence and a stayed
eight-year sentence.120 In addition, the judge ordered Oakley to
spend five years on probation, during which he could not father any
children “unless he demonstrates that he ha[s] the ability to support
them and that he is supporting the children he already ha[s].”121
Navajo woman in New Mexico sentenced to prison for child abuse).
113. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 138 (1998). See generally DOROTHY
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (discussing the
negative impact of child welfare intervention on African American families).
114. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 89; Rachel Roth, The Perils of Pregnancy:
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 149 (2002).
115. See MINK, supra note 113 (discussing the racial politics of welfare policy).
116. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02.
117. See Tamar Lewin, Father Owing Child Support Loses a Right to Procreate,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A14.
118. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201 (stating the charges against the defendant).
119. See id. (describing the case’s factual background).
120. See id. at 203 (listing the case’s procedural history).
121. Id.
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Oakley challenged this provision of his sentence.122
It is worth noting at the outset that a few months after the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reached its decision in the case, the court
denied Oakley’s motion for reconsideration. At that time, the Chief
Justice, joined by the other two women on the court, issued a
concurring opinion to clarify two significant facts.123 First, Oakley was
completely delinquent in his support payment for a period of
precisely four months, months during which he was employed and
could have made payments.124 Most of the time, he did pay at least
some child support, “in excess of” seventy percent of his
obligations.125 While consistently shirking on thirty percent of his
payments and being $25,000 in arrears does not make Oakley an
angel, this information paints a different picture than the majority’s
discussion of his “persistent refusal to pay a cent to his children.”126
Second, the opinion withdraws references made by the majority to
Oakley’s intimidation of one of his own children at another trial, and
to Oakley having abused at least one of his own children.127 This
correction is particularly significant given that the majority decision is
replete with references to “child victims” and “victimizing.”128 The
language of the decision seems to conflate physical abuse and nonsupport: “[I]t is overwhelmingly obvious that any child he fathers in
the future is doomed to a future of neglect, abuse, or worse. That as
yet unborn child is a victim from the day it is born.”129 Alongside the
various references to intimidation, this conflation makes it easy for the
reader to construe Oakley as violent and dangerous, on top of being
irresponsible and unfair. For some, the depiction of Oakley as
abusive may lend at least moral support to the requirement not to
have more children.130
The Court of Appeals affirmed the no-more-children condition in a

122. See id. (presenting a constitutional challenge to the terms of his probation).
123. See State v. Oakley, 635 N.W.2d 760, 760-62 (Wis. 2001) (denying the
defendant’s motion for reconsideration and presenting a justice’s concurring opinion
outlining key facts in the case).
124. See id. at 761.
125. See id.
126. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213 n.28.
127. See Oakley, 635 N.W.2d at 760 (removing this language from its opinion).
128. See, e.g., Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208.
129. Id. at 215.
130. See generally Katherine E. McCanna, Note, A Hot Debate in the Summer of
2001: State v. Oakley’s Excessive Intrusion on Procreative Rights, 36 IND. L. REV. 857
(2003) (arguing that the decision will lead to increased efforts by courts to curtail
procreative rights in certain situations).
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brief, unsigned, unpublished opinion.131 The court found the
probation condition to be “narrowly drawn” and “reasonably related
to Oakley’s rehabilitation and protection of the public,” satisfying
constitutional standards.132 The court completely glosses over the
role of women in carrying out the terms of probation: “Oakley’s
condition of probation does not prohibit him from engaging in
sexual activity. It merely prohibits Oakley from having additional
children whom he cannot support, a task at which Oakley has wholly
failed and for which he has been held criminally liable.”133
What lies between the freedom to engage in sexual activity and the
requirement not to have children is necessarily birth control. Unless
Oakley has a vasectomy, this burden ultimately falls on women. That
is, because no method of birth control is perfect, a woman may get
pregnant despite diligent efforts at using contraception.134 As the
Eighth Circuit recognized in a related case, “[s]hort of having a
probation officer follow [him] twenty-four hours a day, there is no way
to prevent [him] from fathering more children.”135 No way, that is,
except by exerting pressure on any sex partner Oakley should happen
to impregnate. As Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Bradley puts it:
Because the condition is triggered only upon the birth of a child,
the risk of imprisonment creates a strong incentive for a man in
Oakley’s position to demand from the woman the termination of
her pregnancy. It places the woman in an untenable position: have
an abortion or be responsible for Oakley going to prison for eight
years. Creating an incentive to procure an abortion in order to
comply with conditions of probation is a result that I am not
prepared to foster.136

Bradley’s concern is one of several issues that divided the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in this case. The court split four-to-three along
gender lines: all the men upheld the terms of Oakley’s probation, and
all the women dissented.137 This result may initially be surprising,
given that women belong to the class most affected by the lack of
child support. But where the majority sees women primarily as victims
131. See State v. Oakley, 619 N.W. 2d 308 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000), aff’d, 629 N.W.2d
200 (Wis. 2001).
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Facts About Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (demonstrating
the effectiveness rates for various forms of birth control, concluding that, with the
exception
of
abstinence,
no
method
is
absolutely
fail-safe),
at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/bc/bcfacts2.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
135. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992).
136. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 200.
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of men’s wrongdoing, as damsels in economic distress, the dissenters
present a more complicated picture of gender, accountability, and
reproductive politics.
Returning to the abortion question, the majority does not take
Bradley’s concern seriously enough to address. Justice Wilcox merely
chides Bradley for invoking the “specter” of coercive abortion, in one
of the many footnotes where they battle with each other.138 Yet
Bradley is hardly the first judge to be troubled by this possibility.139
The majority’s insensitivity to possible coercion is curious given the
way the majority positions itself as the true champion of women.
The larger implications of the decision also divide the court. The
majority accuses the dissenters of defending “Oakley’s absolute right
to procreate children while refusing to support them,” as if they are
callously indifferent to the plight of poor, single-mother families.140
The dissenting justices are not oblivious to the fact that women suffer
disproportionately when non-custodial parents abdicate their
obligations.141 But their concerns transcend the particulars of
Oakley’s case; as Bradley puts it, “[W]e must keep in mind what is
really at stake in this case. The fundamental right to have children,
shared by us all, is damaged by today’s decision.”142 The majority’s
own presentation of data on parents who fail to pay child support
“belies its contention that this case is truly exceptional;” instead, it has
the potential to affect thousands of men in the state.143 Justice Sykes
also objects to what she calls “a compulsory, state-sponsored, courtenforced financial test for future parenthood.”144 She agrees that the
state’s “objective of collecting past and future support for [Oakley’s]
children, who are entitled to and need it” is “significant and
laudable,” but the means cannot stand when less restrictive
alternatives are available, such as imposing jail time with work release
for mandatory employment, garnishing wages, and intercepting tax
returns.145
Ultimately, conditioning parenthood on any sort of state criteria
138. See id. at 215 n.34 (arguing that Bradley’s dissent intentionally circumvents
the real issue).
139. See, e.g., Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Zaring
v. California, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 270 (Ct. App. 1992); Kansas v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d
313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
140. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208 n.22.
141. See id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 221 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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may, as Bradley says, “affect the rights of every citizen in this state,
man or woman, rich or poor.”146 Although this particular decision
restricts and penalizes men, it cannot do so without implicating
women. The dissenting opinions do not draw out all of the
connections, but we can fill them in: the history of reproductive
politics makes clear that women bear the brunt of scorn heaped on
parents deemed too poor to have children, and women have borne
the brunt of coercive measures directed at discouraging both sexes
from reproducing, including unwilling and unwitting sterilization.147
V. A MISFORTUNE OR A CRIME? COURT ORDERS PROHIBITING
PROCREATION148
At the time the Wisconsin Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Oakley, only two other appellate courts had upheld sexual or
reproductive restrictions on men, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
relied on them both. In 1997, a Wisconsin court upheld a probation
condition imposed on Kenneth Krebs, convicted of sexually assaulting
his daughter.149 For twenty years, Krebs must receive approval from
his probation officer before engaging in a “dating, intimate, or
sexual” relationship, and the probation officer must verify that Krebs
seeks only the companionship of adult women who are aware of his
criminal record.150 The officer who testified about the condition
called it a “rule” and made it sound routine rather than a condition
imposed uniquely on Krebs, suggesting that other men may leave
similar restrictions unchallenged. The court found the condition
reasonably related to Krebs’ rehabilitation and protective of public
safety, and rejected Krebs’ claim that it interfered with his right to
procreate.151
Across the country in Oregon, a court upheld a three-year
condition imposed on Tad Kline, convicted of child abuse, after he

146. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
147. See Jennifer Foote Sweeney, Something Cheesy in the State of Wisconsin,
SALON.COM (July 13, 2001) (describing the implications for reproductive rights), at
http://dir.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/07/13/wisconsin/index.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004). See generally CAROLE MCCANN, BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1916-45 (1994) (describing the “economic ethic of fertility” that
influenced birth control politics in the early twentieth century).
148. See Dominguez v. California, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating
that becoming pregnant while unmarried is a misfortune, not a crime, and striking an
order not to have children outside of marriage).
149. See generally Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
150. See id. at 27-28.
151. See id. at 28 (holding that the condition restricts a constitutional right, but
does not deny a right).
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violated his probation.152 In order to father another child, Kline must
successfully complete drug treatment, anger management, and any
other required program, and must get prior written approval from the
court.153 The court found that the condition does not totally
eliminate Kline’s reproductive rights and it protects potential victims
from injury.154 In all these cases, a woman’s pregnancy and/or the
birth of a child would provide evidence that the man had violated the
conditions of his probation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dissenters
distinguished these two cases from Oakley’s because they do not
condition sex or reproduction on the basis of financial criteria.155
As the cases above suggest, courts imposed sexual and reproductive
restrictions on men for two reasons: child abuse156 and failure to
support their children financially.157 This second category is fairly
broad. One man was convicted of intentionally refusing to pay child
support.158 Another had broken into a grocery store to steal food in
152. See generally Oregon v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
153. See id. at 699.
154. See id.
155. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority in this case cites no cases where a court has allowed the right to have
children to be conditioned on financial status).
156. See Smith v. Arizona, 725 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Ariz. 1986) (finding that the lower
court did not have the power to order the defendant to be sterilized after his
conviction for child abuse); Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (reversing the lower court’s probation condition prohibiting the
defendant from fathering a child after his conviction for negligent child abuse);
Kline, 963 P.2d at 699 (finding the defendant’s conviction for first degree criminal
mistreatment of his child allowed for a condition prohibiting him from fathering any
more children); Krebs, 568 N.W.2d at 28 (holding that the defendant’s conviction for
sexual abuse of his daughter warranted a restriction on his right to engage in a sexual
relationship).
157. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (upholding a ban on procreation as a
condition of probation); United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992)
(reversing an order not to have children outside of marriage); Burchell v. State, 419
So. 2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (striking a ban on procreation but not specifying
the nature of the man’s crime); Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (reversing a lower court decision requiring marriage and forbidding
extramarital sex by the defendants, who were all parents and who were all convicted
of burglary or forging checks); see also Judge Orders Drug Dealer To Halt Sex for 5
Years, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1988, at 13 (describing an order by a federal judge that
Michael Youngblood not have sex for five years), available at 1988 WL 3433037; Larry
Copeland, Does ‘Scarlet Letter’ Judge Cross the Line?, USA TODAY, July 9, 2001,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/07/10/texas-judge.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (describing the case of Robert Torres, who was convicted
of statutory rape in 1999, and subsequently fathered children with two teenage girls,
children he did not appear to be supporting). At a probation revocation hearing in
2001, the judge ordered Torres not to have sex outside of marriage. Id. According to
Torres’ attorney, he later married, rendering the order moot. See Email from Gerald
A. Rogen, Attorney at Law, to Rachel Roth, Research Fellow, Ibis Reproductive Health
(Mar. 1, 2004) (on file with author). Cases arising after Oakley are discussed in the
conclusion. Infra notes 213-25 and accompanying text.
158. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202.
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order to, in the state’s words, “feed and care for [his] illegitimate
children.”159 The crime that brought this man before the court was
not failure to pay support, but the court took it as evidence that he
was unable to fulfill his parental responsibilities. Another man was
sentenced not to have children out of wedlock (more specifically not
to impregnate any woman not his wife, while leaving unclear the
question of whether he had a wife) until he proved he was supporting
his children.160 His crime: intent to sell drugs, something completely
unrelated to child support.
Five of the eight courts to review impositions on men found them
unacceptable. Two Florida courts overturned the restrictions because
they did not consider them reasonably related to past or future
criminal activity, they impinged on non-criminal conduct, and they
coerced marriage by banning non-marital sex or procreation.161 The
Arizona Supreme Court found the imposition of sterilization in a
child abuse case outside the judge’s jurisdiction.162 The Eighth
Circuit found a ban on impregnation unworkable, counterproductive
(because a father remanded to prison cannot support his children),
and outside the trial judge’s authority.163 Few courts took the step to
analyze the constitutional right to procreate, because they could
overturn the conditions on other grounds.164
Like unworkability, ambiguity bothered one court: a third Florida
court found that a ban on “fathering” children could have two
meanings—”begetting” and parenting.165 Because the defendant was
already prohibited from rearing or even being near children, the state
could prevent him from abusing any future children he happened to
“father” in the procreative sense.
In another case, Michael
Youngblood may have seen no need to appeal a judge’s order to
“obey all local, state and federal laws [pertaining to] fornication and
bastardy,” because Pennsylvania had repealed those laws and there

159. See Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 47 (relaying the state’s argument that the
condition is reasonable and serves a useful rehabilitative purpose).
160. See Smith, 972 F.2d at 962.
161. See Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48 (holding that although the punishment
intended to alleviate the financial pressure on the appellants convicted of forgery, it
was nevertheless invalid); Burchell, 419 So. 2d at 358.
162. See Smith v. State, 725 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that courts can
only order sterilization as a condition of sentencing under specific statutory
authority).
163. See Smith, 972 F.2d at 962.
164. But see id. at 962 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and
observing the importance of the right to have offspring).
165. See Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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were no federal ones with which to contend.166 In Youngblood, a
federal judge ordered the defendant not to have sex for five years, but
made no provisions for enforcing the order.167 A Texas case was not
reviewed because the defendant, ordered not to have sex outside of
wedlock, got married.168
Courts have imposed reproductive restrictions on women for
primarily three reasons: child abuse and neglect,169 drug use,170 and
166. See Judge Orders Drug Dealer To Halt Sex for 5 Years, supra note 157, at 13.
167. See id.
168. See Email from Gerald A. Rogen, supra note 157.
169. See Smith v. State, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) (overturning sterilization as
condition of reduced prison sentence); Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (overturning
ban on pregnancy); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 7 (overturning ban on pregnancy and
marriage); Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1335 (overturning ban on having children); see
also Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725-26 (Cal. 1998)
(describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal.
Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1992), at 1992 WL 685375, in which the judge ordered Norplant;
appeal mooted when defendant sent to prison for violating other probation
conditions); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. 1995) (overturning ban on
pregnancy but upholding pregnancy testing); Trammel, 751 N.E.2d at 283
(overturning ban on pregnancy); Mosburg, 768 P.2d at 313 (overturning ban on
pregnancy); In re Lacey P., 433 S.E.2d 518 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that a judge’s
order to be sterilized was mooted when the woman obtained Norplant); Dresser,
supra note 109, at 136 (describing a 1990 Florida case where a judge ordered use of
contraceptives as part of plea arrangement); Id. at 137 (describing a Tennessee case
where the judge “offered” a lighter sentence for a married couple accused of child
sexual abuse if the woman agreed to be sterilized); Arthur, supra note 92, at 19-21
(citing Nebraska v. Carlton, No. CR90-1937 (Neb. County Ct., 1991), in which the
judge ordered use of birth control); Saunders, supra note 92, at 214 n.28 (describing
an Arizona case overturning in 1988 a lifetime of compulsory birth control); Jeff
Feeley, Woman Accepts Sterilization as Term of Plea: Charged with Murdering Her
Child, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, and Sterilized Woman Pleads Guilty To
Manslaughter, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 22, 1986 (describing a South Carolina case
where a woman underwent sterilization as part of a plea bargain); Florida: Judge
Overturns State Adoption “Gag Rule”, 5 ABORTION REP., July 23, 1993 (describing a
Florida case where a judge ordered a woman to use Norplant); Judge Orders Mother
To Be Given Contraceptive, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 6, 1991 (describing a Texas
case in which a woman obtained Norplant as part of a plea bargain to avoid prison);
Judge Says Sterilization May Ease Sentence for Child’s Death, APWIRES, July 21, 1988
(describing an Indiana case where the judge suggested leniency in exchange for
sterilization); Makeig, Women’s Probation Includes Birth Control, supra note 107, at
21 (describing a Texas case where a woman “agreed” to use Norplant); John Makeig,
Surgical Deterrent: Mom Convicted of Child Abuse Picks Birth-Control Implant Over
Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1992 (describing a Texas case where woman obtained
Norplant to avoid prison); Medical Sterilization Ordered for Abusive Louisiana
Mother, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 12, 2000, at A14 (describing a Louisiana case where a
judge ordered sterilization or ten years in prison); Retarded Woman Agrees To
Norplant Instead of Jail, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 1994 (describing a
Pennsylvania case); Estela Villanueva, Forced Contraception Protested: Legislator
Pushes Bill To Ban Courts from Ordering Use of Birth Control by Women, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1993 (describing an Illinois case where a woman “accepted”
a sentence including Norplant). In two additional cases of child abuse, judges did
not ban pregnancy but did order women to submit to regular pregnancy tests. See
Harriet Chiang, Monthly Pregnancy Test Ordered: Woman’s Children Have AlcoholRelated Defects, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 1995, at A19 (describing a California case where
a judge ordered pregnancy tests); Laura Griffin, Mother Pleads in Newborn’s Death,
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criminal activity not directly related to children.171 In child abuse
cases, by far the largest category, judges ordered women not to have
more children.172 In cases of theft or check fraud, however, judges
ordered women not to have children or sex outside of marriage.173
No woman was restricted because she failed to pay child support, but
judges’ disapproval of women who rely on public assistance to support
their children came into play in sentencing decisions.174
Appellate courts found many reasons to overturn these restrictions:
because they bear no direct relationship to the crime;175 they restrict
non-criminal conduct, or coerce conduct (marriage);176 they are
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 9, 1993, at 1B (describing a Florida case where a judge
ordered pregnancy tests or proof of birth control). Cases arising after Oakley are
discussed infra in the conclusion.
170. See Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263 (overturning ban on pregnancy); State v.
Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (overturning birth control or
sterilization as condition of probation); Court Removes Another ‘No Pregnancy’
Order, APWIRES, July 3, 2001 (describing two cases where the Montana Supreme
Court overturned bans on pregnancy; in one case, the court upheld required
pregnancy tests).
171. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (overturning ban on pregnancy outside
of marriage); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (overturning
ban on pregnancy outside of marriage); Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 46 (overturning ban
on extramarital sex in three consolidated the cases of two women and one man);
State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (overturning ban on pregnancy
outside of marriage).
172. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (overturning the trial court’s order
that a woman refrain from conceiving a child during her probation period). The
probation order stemmed from the woman’s felony conviction of child
endangerment. Id. at 359.
173. See, e.g., Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (considering the trial court’s
probation order, which included the condition that the female defendant, who was
convicted of robbery, not become pregnant without being married).
174. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 267 (highlighting the sentencing judge’s
comments to the defendant regarding two of her children’s receipt of public funds,
when ordering her to refrain from becoming pregnant while on probation); see also
Gregory A. Hall, Judge To Rule Today on No-Sex Plea Deal, COURIER-JOURNAL, May
13, 2002 (describing a Kentucky case from 1993, where the judge told a woman jailed
on charges of failure to pay child support that her release from jail was contingent on
getting a tubal ligation; the judge later suggested that he only meant to “get her
attention,” and the county clerk’s office has no record of appeal).
175. See, e.g., Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114 (invalidating the no-pregnancy
condition of probation, in part, because it bears no relationship to the defendant’s
convictions for grand theft and battery); Norman, 484 So. 2d at 953 (vacating the
probation condition set by the trial court, which required the defendant to refrain
from giving birth to any “illegitimate” children for two years, because the order failed
to relate to the goal of rehabilitating the defendant). But see Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr.
at 364 (finding the trial court’s no-pregnancy restriction reasonably related to the
crime of child endangerment, because the defendant adhered to a strict macrobiotic
diet for herself and her children, and such a diet might compromise healthy fetal
development, should she become pregnant).
176. See, e.g., Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48 (asserting that an order prohibiting
unmarried individuals from engaging in sexual intercourse with anyone other than
spouses coerces them into marriage); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9 (invalidating
probation conditions prohibiting pregnancy and marriage unless probationers
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impermissibly overbroad in their violation of constitutional rights;177
they cannot be enforced;178 or they fall outside the judge’s authority,
and in some cases reflect judges’ personal biases.179 A Florida
appellate court said simply that the condition is “so grossly erroneous
on its face [that] in the interest of justice we must strike it.”180
Compared to cases about men, the greater number of courts focusing
on privacy and procreative liberty could be simply a function of the
greater number of cases. It might also be, however, because of the
social construction of motherhood as more central to women’s
identity than fatherhood is to men’s. That is, restrictions on
motherhood may call for greater reflection and justification because
motherhood is such a defining aspect of women’s lives in American
culture.181 A related issue here is the courts’ concern with the
practical implication of such orders, specifically the concern that if a
woman becomes pregnant, she would be forced to hide her
pregnancy and forego prenatal care, or to seek an abortion,
something the courts (and some prosecutors) found unacceptable.182
Significant differences emerge when comparing the cases about
women and men. First, the record shows that judges are more likely
to impose reproductive restrictions on women than men.183 Second,
judges are more likely to impose these restrictions on women in cases
where the crime had no direct connection to children.184 Two

obtained the trial court’s consent because the condition pertained to non-criminal
conduct).
177. See, e.g., Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 366 (finding the probation order that
prohibited female defendant from conceiving unconstitutionally overbroad because
less restrictive alternatives were available to meet the same rehabilitative purpose).
The court noted that probation orders may be valid even though they infringe on an
individual’s constitutional rights, when required by the circumstances. Id. at 363. See
also Trammel, 751 N.E.2d at 289-90 (invalidating the probation condition that
ordered the defendant not to become pregnant because it violated her privacy right
of procreation).
178. See Arthur, supra note 92, at 20 (noting where a judge conceded to the
unenforceability of a mandatory contraception order).
179. See, e.g., Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93 (overturning a trial court’s nopregnancy probation order, which, in part, reflected the trial judge’s bias against
using public assistance to help “irresponsible” mothers).
180. Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114.
181. See Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 15, 49 (1992) (discussing various theories of why motherhood is so central to
women’s lives in American culture).
182. See supra note 139 (listing four cases where judges expressed concern about
coerced abortion).
183. See supra notes 156-57, 169-71.
184. See, e.g., Thomas, 519 So. 2d at 1114 (overturning a no-pregnancy-unlessmarried probation condition ordered against a woman who was convicted of grand
theft and battery).
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federal cases stand out as exceptions, where judges ordered men not
to have children even though their crimes had nothing to do with
children or being a father.
Finally, appellate courts did not uphold any of these restrictions on
women. In two cases, the courts considered the woman’s appeal
moot, either because she had been sent to prison for violating other
conditions of her probation, or because she (apparently voluntarily)
obtained Norplant while appealing an order that the local health
department “assist” her in obtaining surgical sterilization.185
When striking down a trial court’s probation order prohibiting nonmarital sex for two women and one man in 1980, a Florida appellate
court stated, “While the trial court obviously intended to prevent the
birth of additional children to alleviate additional financial pressure
on appellants, the condition does not have that effect. Instead, it
coerces appellants into marriage so they may lawfully engage in
sex.”186 This appellate court was very generous in its reading of the
trial court’s intention: to alleviate additional financial pressure on the
defendants, poor, single parents.187 Some sentencing judges have
been rather explicit in their concerns that defendants before them—
in these cases, all women—are burdening the state with their
“illegitimate” children.188 In 1965, a California judge conditioned
probation for Mercedes Dominguez, a twenty-year-old unmarried
mother of two who was pregnant at time of sentencing, on not getting
pregnant out of wedlock, and he made good on his threat to revoke
her probation when she became pregnant again.189 The appellate
court overturned this condition, with a clear reprimand to the judge
who let his personal views on “welfare mothers” affect his
sentencing.190 The court quotes him as saying, “You are going to
prison unless you are married first. You already have too many of
those,” as if children were objects to be collected, and chiding her for

185. See ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 152 (explaining that an appellate court
dismissed Darlene Johnson’s appeal as moot after she was remanded to prison); see
also In re Lacey P., 433 S.E.2d at 525-26 (distinguishing the trial court’s order that the
Department of Health and Human Services assist the defendant in her “expressed
desire” to be sterilized, from a court order mandating her to become sterile, an order
which the court doubted could ever be valid).
186. Wiggins, 386 So. 2d at 48; see id. at 48 n.2 (noting that fornication—defined
as sex with an unmarried woman—was illegal in Florida until 1979, when the state
supreme court struck down the statute as an impermissible sex-based classification).
187. See id. at 48 (disagreeing with the trial court’s presumption that “legitimate”
children pose less of a financial burden on parents than extramarital children).
188. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267.
189. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (relating the history of the case).
190. See id. at 625.
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letting the community assume responsibility for her children.191
Twenty-five years later, in California v. Zaring, an appellate court
remarked on the similarity between Dominguez and the case before it
for review.192 The sentencing judge had scolded the defendant,
stating, “I want [to make] it clear that one of the reasons I am making
this order is you’ve got five children. You’re thirty years old. None of
your children are in your custody or control. Two of them on
AFDC.”193 Similarly, a Louisiana judge told a twenty-year-old mother
of two “illegitimate children” that having children outside of marriage
indicated “irresponsible thinking.”194
In California, three cases that went up on appeal all justified
prohibiting pregnancy by referring to the woman’s dependence on
public assistance.195 The women who pursued these appeals were
Latina, African American, and white.196 The California cases illustrate
that women from many groups have been affected by judicial orders
while also making clear that the invocation of welfare, if accepted as a
legitimate reason to limit reproduction in the criminal sentencing
context, would have a disproportionate impact on women of color.
CONCLUSION: STATE POWER, GENDER POLITICS, AND THE RESILIENCE
OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL
The cases discussed in this article demonstrate a number of ways
that courts dealing with reproductive rights claims in the criminal
justice arena can suppress gender equality. A crucial component of
court decisions concerning men is the pivotal, but unstated, role of
women. The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Oakley is a
danger to women presented as if it were a gift, a penalty imposed on
men to “protect” women: the decision makes women vulnerable to
191. Id. (reviewing trial court’s remarks to the defendant, which included asking
whether she knew where the Planned Parenthood Clinic was located). Women’s
ability to obtain contraception in 1965 would have been a matter of local discretion,
and abortion was illegal everywhere, making compliance with the court’s order
difficult and potentially dangerous. See generally MCCANN, supra note 147; TYLER
MAY, supra note 112; ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000
(Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
192. See Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-74 (reviewing a no-pregnancy probation
order resulting from a conviction for possessing and being under the influence of
heroin). The appellate court highlighted that the trial court here, as well as the trial
court in the Dominguez case, made commentary that reflected their personal social
values. Id. at 373-74.
193. Id. at 368.
194. Norman, 484 So. 2d at 953.
195. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93; Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266-67;
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
196. See Arthur, supra note 92, at 11 (describing Zaring as white).
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coercion and imperils their right to have children.197 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit panel decision in Gerber expanded rights for some men
at the expense of all women.198
By emphasizing these cases’ implications for gender equality, I do
not mean to suggest that men do not face very real consequences if
they are caught violating the terms of their probation or parole. They
do. But there is no way to engage in this particular form of policing
men without also policing women, and this basic fact often escapes
judicial notice.199 If the danger in some of these cases lurks under
the radar, it is patently obvious in others. In a Tennessee case, for
example, a judge “negotiated” a sterilization-for-probation deal with
Mrs. Gross, but did nothing to curtail the fertility of Mr. Gross, even
though both pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse of their
children.200 To make matters worse, the judge presented two
alternatives: either five years prison for both or ten years probation for
both if Mrs. Gross got her “tubes tied,” making his freedom
contingent on her decision.201 Sentencing judges appear to take
more latitude with women than with men by restricting their
reproductive lives more often and for more reasons, such as
prohibiting childbearing outside of marriage when women commit
economic crimes.202
This pattern fits with courts’ historic
preoccupation with policing white women’s sexuality and gender
conformity.203 The economic and social marginality of poor women
who are single mothers relying on public assistance appears to be a
powerful combination for some judges who see enforcing “personal
responsibility” as a legitimate exercise of their authority.204
Courts also apply reproductive restrictions to women who have
197. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200 (upholding a ban on procreation for a man
who had not paid child support).
198. See Gerber, 264 F.3d at 882.
199. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing how the birth of a
child would provide evidence that a man had violated his probation).
200. See Dresser, supra note 109, at 137.
201. See id.
202. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., NICOLE RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE: WOMEN, PRISONS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 41 (2d ed. 1990); LUCIA ZEDNER, Wayward Sisters: The Prison for Women,
in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 329 (Norval Morris & David Rothman eds., 1998) (explaining, in addition,
that before the advent of gender-based equal protection, some courts and sentencing
guidelines gave women harsher sentences than men, even in the case of a man and
woman breaking the law together, because they thought women were harder to
rehabilitate, since committing crime in the first place signified their fall from gender
requirements).
204. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving
women who receive public assistance).
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abused children and to women who have used drugs,205 because these
women fall short of the mark of normative womanhood.206 These
cases suggest that courts as disciplinary institutions cast a wider net
with the women who come before them than with men. What then
are we to make of courts’ greater willingness to uphold reproductive
restrictions imposed on men? Does this too hark back to a kind of
gender inequality, expressed in the motherhood imperative?
One judge who had ordered at least two women to use birth control
defended himself against accusations of discrimination this way: “This
Court in a proper case with appropriate technology would make a
similar order against a man. The mere fact that technology has not
arrived to implant a man does not mean that it should not be used in
a woman.”207 In these comments, Judge Broadman does not consider
the ways that sex discrimination and the close cultural association
between women and all things reproductive might influence the
development of contraceptive technology and forestall the “arrival” of
means to restrict men.
In addition to the implications these cases have for women’s rights
outside of the criminal justice system, the cases have important
implications for prisoners’ rights beyond reproduction. As Franklin
Zimring says of the final decision in Gerber:
[T]his kind of litigation outcome may be a symptom of a much
larger failure to take seriously the question of the legitimate
interests of prisoners and those who are in sustained relationships
with them. I am much more worried about the majority’s
dismissiveness of the human interest involved in a case like this than
I am about the ease of ridiculing the idea of a constitutional right to
send sperm through the mail.208

An op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle displays exactly the
dismissiveness Zimring fears by saying: “Earth to the Ninth Circuit
court: the ‘legitimate penological reason’ [to deny Gerber’s request]
is that prison is punishment. No freedom. No hot Starbucks lattes.
No new babies.”209
Although not as mean-spirited as this
commentator, the judge writing for the Eighth Circuit was
205. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
206. See generally MOTHER TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL
DILEMMAS (Julia A. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999) (describing punitive
responses to women who do not meet societal standards of good motherhood).
207. Michelle Oberman, Commentary: The Control of Pregnancy and the
Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6 n.24 (1992).
208. Henry Weinstein, Inmate May Not Ship Wife Semen, L.A. TIMES, May 24,
2002, at B1.
209. See Debra Saunders, Ill-Conceived Parenthood, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 2001, at
A13.
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unsympathetic when Steven Goodwin and his wife expressed concern
that by the time he got out of prison, she would be facing greater risks
of having a child with birth defects.210 The court dismissed this worry
with a few statistics, presuming to assess the risks for Goodwin and his
partner, when reproductive risk assessment is both a highly personal
and a highly cultural enterprise, not one of mere odds.211
The publicity and success of the Oakley case seem to be inspiring
more prosecutors and judges to impose sexual and reproductive
restrictions.212 In the spring of 2002, for instance, Luther Crawford
of Kentucky signed an agreement pleading guilty to two counts of
flagrant nonsupport and agreeing to abstinence as a condition of
probation.213 Crawford subsequently challenged the condition, but
the judge presiding over the case ultimately sentenced him to jail
instead, leaving the status of the abstinence condition unclear.214 In
what might be considered a pre-emptive move (or “proactive,” as the
plea agreement put it), a twenty-eight-year-old Kentucky man being
prosecuted by the same government attorney underwent a vasectomy
in order to improve his chances of getting probation instead of jail
time.215 The news story suggests he owed “more than $1,000” in child
support.216 Hopefully, this low dollar amount is a typo.
An Ohio judge concerned that an outright ban on procreation
might not survive appellate review instead imposed a “softer”
requirement that a defendant “take reasonable efforts to avoid
conception,” such as using birth control.217 While not as likely to
trigger incarceration if violated, this requirement invites a high level
of micro-management on the part of the judge.218 Ohio courts in the
210. See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1396 (upholding a policy to prohibit a prisoner
from providing semen to his wife for the purpose of insemination).
211. See id. at 1397 (citing to statistics that predict the chances of having a child
with Downs Syndrome). See generally RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE
FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing how
women interpret the meanings of amniocentesis).
212. See Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621.
213. See Hall, supra note 174.
214. See Bruce Schreiner, Deadbeat Dad Sent To Prison But Avoids No-Sex
Condition, APWIRES, May 14, 2002.
215. See Man Undergoes Vasectomy To Try To Win Probation, APWIRES, July 26,
2002.
216. Id.
217. Terry Oblander, Fathering More Children Could Land Dad in Jail, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 7, 2002, at B1, B3; see also Terry Oblander, Fatherhood Ban
Considered for Deadbeat Dads, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 27, 2002 (discussing a
court’s strategy to deter a defendant from fathering any more children during his
five-year probation for failing to pay child support).
218. See Oblander, Fathering More Children, supra note 217, at B1, B3 (noting
that the judge said that the defendant “could father a child without violating his
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1970s and 1990s had struck down procreation bans imposed on
women.219 Though the press may now be especially attuned to cases
about men, women are also feeling the consequences. One month
after the state supreme court upheld Oakley’s punishment, a
Wisconsin judge placed a twenty-six-year-old woman on probation for
ten years and ordered her not to have children.220 She had been
convicted of second-degree reckless homicide in the starvation of her
infant daughter.221 A Michigan judge ordered a woman facing child
abuse allegations to use a “verifiable” form of birth control, such as an
IUD or Depo-Provera injections.222 Apparently, the first such case in
the state, the judge rescinded his order once confronted with an
appeal.223 A Florida woman who pleaded no contest to attempted
murder of her baby was sterilized as part of the plea agreement.224
And in an apparent first for the entire Northeast region, a New York
judge recently ordered a couple not to have more children until they
prove they can care for the children they already have, all of whom
are in foster care.225
In the Fall of 2002, the United States Supreme Court declined to
hear Gerber’s appeal, sending imprisoned men back to square one if
they encounter administrative resistance to their desire to father
children.226 Perhaps somewhat more surprising, the Court also
rebuffed Oakley’s appeal, ensuring that these conflicts will continue
to arise, but without any guarantee of public oversight, whether from
probation if [the judge] was convinced that [he] had tried to use birth control but it
failed”); see also Ed Meyer, Ohio Court Skeptical of Procreation Limits, BEACON
JOURNAL, May 12, 2004 (describing oral argument before the Ohio Supreme Court
about the probation condition), available at http://www.ohio.com/mld/
beaconjournal/8643952.htm?1c (last visited Sept 27, 2004).
219. See generally Richard, 680 N.E. at 667 (invalidating the tubal ligation and
birth control conditions of the defendant’s probation); Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at
1335 (holding that prohibiting the defendant from having children during her five
year probation period was a violation of her constitutional right to privacy and a
violation of the trial court’s discretion).
220. See Judge Orders Woman To Have No More Children, APWIRES, Aug. 30,
2001 (noting that if this woman violated the order and had more children she could
face up to fifteen years in prison).
221. See id.
222. See Addict’s Birth Control Order Fought, UNITED PRESS INT’L, July 9, 2003.
223. See In re J.N.G. and B.S., No. 246592, 2003 WL 22299795 (Mich. App. Oct. 7,
2003); see also Telephone interview with Michael Steinberg, Legal Director, ACLU of
Michigan (Mar. 1, 2004).
224. See Panhandle Woman’s Sentence Cut, But Illinois Prison Waits, APWIRES,
Apr. 4, 2003.
225. See Marc Santora, Negligent Upstate Couple Is Told Not To Procreate, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at B6 (explaining that the judge did not specify how the woman
should avoid pregnancy).
226. See Gerber v. Hickman, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002).
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the media, watchdog groups, or reviewing courts.227 In this time of
deep budget deficits, we may be seeing greater use of probation as
alternatives to incarceration gain pragmatic political support. The
gulf between sentencing judges’ actions and appellate judges’
evaluations of those actions suggests that these issues will not be
resolved any time soon.

227. See Oakley v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

35

